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The Conceptual Problems Arising
from Legal Pluralism
Jorge Luis Fabra-Zamora*

Abstract
This paper argues that analytical jurisprudence has been insuﬃciently attentive to
three signiﬁcant puzzles highlighted by the legal pluralist tradition: the existence of
commonalities between diﬀerent types of law, the possibility of a distinction
between law and non-law, and the explanatory centrality of the state. I further
argue that the resolution of these questions sets the stage for a renewed agenda of
analytical jurisprudence and has to be considered in attempts for reconciliation
between the academic traditions of analytical jurisprudence and legal pluralism,
often called “pluralist jurisprudence.” I also argue that the resolution of these problems
aﬀects the empirical, doctrinal, and politico-moral inquiries about legal pluralism.
Keywords: Analytical jurisprudence, non-state legal phenomena, distinctiveness of
law, common features of law, centrality of the state
Résumé
Cet article soutient que les travaux analytiques de la jurisprudence n’ont pas été
suﬃsamment soucieux de trois problèmes d’importance qui ont été mis en évidence
par la tradition du pluralisme juridique, soit 1) l’existence de points communs entre
les diﬀérents types de droit, 2) la possibilité d’une distinction entre le droit et le nondroit et 3) la centralité explicative du droit étatique. Je soutiens également que la
résolution de telles questions pourrait d’ailleurs ouvrir la voie à un programme
renouvelé d’analyse jurisprudentielle. De surcroît, cet article suggère que ces
questions doivent être prises en compte dans les tentatives de réconciliation entre
les deux traditions théoriques, souvent appelées « jurisprudence pluraliste ». Finalement, je soutiens aussi que la résolution de ces problèmes touche les enquêtes
empiriques, doctrinales et politico-morales sur le pluralisme juridique.
Mots-clés : Pluralisme juridique, analyse jurisprudentielle, phénomènes juridiques
non étatiques, spéciﬁcité du droit, traits communs du droit, centralité de l’État
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I. Introduction
Members of the heterogeneous intellectual tradition known as “legal pluralism”
have repeatedly criticized the intellectual tradition of analytical jurisprudence for
its inattention to and inability to explain non-state legal phenomena, i.e., putative
forms of law diﬀerent from state legal systems.1 In response, jurisprudents have
argued that pluralists’ objections are based on systematic misrepresentations of the
views held by respectable contemporary philosophers.2 In their opinion, the
problem posed by pluralists’ complaints is not “a particularly profound one,”
and the “fertile resources” of jurisprudence can explain the phenomena that
pluralists have highlighted.3
This paper rejects this view. While jurisprudents’ response to the pluralist
challenge is mostly correct, I argue that the jurisprudential rejection of the claims of
the pluralist tradition is too hasty. In particular, jurisprudents have been insuﬃciently attentive to three signiﬁcant puzzles highlighted by the pluralist tradition.
These concern the existence of commonalities between diﬀerent types of law, the
possibility of a distinction between law and non-law, and the explanatory centrality
of the state. I further argue that the resolution of these questions sets the stage for a
renewed agenda of analytical jurisprudence and has to be considered in attempts
for reconciliation between the two academic traditions, often called “pluralist
jurisprudence.” I also argue that the resolution of these problems aﬀects the
empirical, doctrinal, and politico-moral inquiries about the fact of legal pluralism.

II. Setting the Stage
This section provides some foundational clariﬁcations for this inquiry. I begin by
diﬀerentiating between the fact of legal pluralism and an academic tradition that
1

2

3

For introductions to literature on legal pluralism, see John Griﬃths, “What Is Legal Pluralism?,”
The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unoﬃcial Law 18, no. 24 (1986): 1–55; Sally Engle Merry, “Legal
Pluralism,” Law & Society Review 22, no. 5 (1988): 869–96; Gordon R. Woodman, “Ideological
Combat and Social Observation,” The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unoﬃcial Law 30, no.
42 (1998): 21–59; Anne Griﬃths, “Legal Pluralism,” in Law and Social Theory, 1st ed., ed. Reza
Banakar and Max Travers (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002), 289–310; Brian Z. Tamanaha, “Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global,” Sydney Law Review 30 (2008): 376–410;
William Twining, “Normative and Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective,” Duke Journal of
Comparative & International Law 20 (2009): 473–517; Ralf Michaels, “Global Legal Pluralism,”
Annual Review of Law and Social Science 5, no. 1 (2009): 243–62; Margaret Davies, “Legal
Pluralism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research, ed. Peter Cane and Herbert
M. Kritzer (Oxford University Press, 2010), 805–24; John Griﬃths, “Legal Pluralism,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition), ed. James D. Wright
(Oxford: Elsevier, 2015), 757–61.
John Gardner, Law as a Leap of Faith: Essays on Law in General (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012), chap. 11; John Gardner, “What Is Legal Pluralism?” (Osgoode Hall Law School, 8 May 2013),
2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q-aTJgTTOA8&feature=youtube_gdata_player; Victor
M. Muñiz-Fraticelli, The Structure of Pluralism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), chap. 6;
Catherine Valcke, “Three Perils of Legal Pluralism,” in Concepts of Law: Comparative, Jurisprudential, and Social Science Perspectives, ed. Seán Patrick Donlan and Lukas Heckendorn Urscheler
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), 123–35; Cormac MacAmhlaigh, “Does Legal Theory Have a Pluralism
Problem?,” in Oxford Handbook of Global Legal Pluralism, ed. Paul Schiﬀ Berman (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2020), 268–98. For my view, see Jorge Luis Fabra-Zamora, “Analytical Jurisprudence and Legal Pluralism,” McGill Law Journal 65 (2022).
MacAmhlaigh, “Does Legal Theory Have a Pluralism Problem?,” 298.
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studies such a fact. Then, I argue that the objections of the pluralist tradition to
analytical jurisprudence fail. However, despite this failure, I close the section by
noting that pluralists have successfully identiﬁed forms of non-state legal phenomena, highlighting two deﬁcits of the state-centric theories of jurisprudence.

1. What Is Legal Pluralism?
The expression “legal pluralism” is used in two diﬀerent senses. In the ﬁrst sense,
legal pluralism is used to note a situation or state of aﬀairs that I shall call “LP.”
LP: A situation of coexistence and interaction of semi-autonomous legal
orders in a speciﬁc context.4

Examples of scenarios of legal pluralism include the interactions between the state
law and diﬀerent forms of customary, folk, religious, and indigenous law, unoﬃcial
laws created by associations, trade unions, marginalized groups, and religious
minorities, and novel forms of non-state legal phenomena such as human rights
law, lex mercatoria (transnational commercial law), the European Union, and
multinational corporations among themselves and with state law in “global legal
pluralism.” It is critical to note that, in this factual sense, “legal pluralism is not a
theory of law or an explanation of how it functions” but a situation, condition or
state of aﬀairs that “alerts observers… that law takes many forms and can exist in
parallel regimes.”5
In the second sense, legal pluralism is used to refer to a heterogeneous
intellectual tradition. Members of this tradition do not recognize as “pluralists”
all of those who view LP as a factual reality and attempt to identify and explain its
empirical, doctrinal, and politico-moral implications. Instead, according to a
pervasive narrative unveiled in the introductory paragraph of most pluralist works,
pluralism contrasts with “centralism” or “monism” that pluralists deﬁne as the view
that “law is and should be the law of the state, uniform for all persons, exclusive of
all other law, and administered by a single set of state institutions.”6 In other words,
centralists reduce law to the norms emanating from, or recognized by, state oﬃcials
and deny legal status to other putative normative phenomena. As a result, they do
4

5
6

cf. Jacques Vanderlinden, “Le Pluralisme Juridique: Essai de Synthèse,” in Le Pluralisme Juridique,
ed. John Gilissen (Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1971), 19; J. Griﬃths, “What Is
Legal Pluralism?,” 2; Merry, “Legal Pluralism,” 870; A. Griﬃths, “Legal Pluralism,” 2002; Twining,
“Normative and Legal Pluralism,” 489; Michaels, “Global Legal Pluralism,” 245; Brian
Z. Tamanaha, “The Promise and Conundrums of Pluralist Jurisprudence,” The Modern Law
Review 82, no. 1 (2019): 159.
Sally Engle Merry, “Legal Pluralism in Practice,” McGill Law Journal 51, no. 9 (2013): 2; J. Griﬃths,
“What Is Legal Pluralism?,” 4, 12.
J. Griﬃths, “What Is Legal Pluralism?,” 2; cf. Marc Galanter, “Justice in Many Rooms: Courts,
Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law,” The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unoﬃcial Law 13,
no. 19 (1981): 1n1, 20–21; Merry, “Legal Pluralism,” 874; Michaels, “Global Legal Pluralism,” 261;
Roderick A. Macdonald, “Pluralistic Human Rights? Universal Human Wrongs?,” in Dialogues on
Human Rights and Legal Pluralism, ed. René Provost and Colleen Sheppard (Dordrecht: Springer,
2013), 23–24; Hanisah Binte Abdullah Sani, “State Law and Legal Pluralism: Towards an
Appraisal,” The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unoﬃcial Law 52, no. 1 (2020): 83; Peer Zumbansen, “Manifestations and Arguments: The Everyday Operation of Transnational Legal Pluralism,”
in Schiﬀ Berman, The Oxford Handbook of Global Legal Pluralism, 234; Schiﬀ Berman, The Oxford
Handbook of Global Legal Pluralism, 31.
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not consider forms of non-state legal phenomena as “law,” thereby denying the
possibility of LP.
In my view, the contrast with centralism is crucial to the characterization of the
pluralist intellectual tradition. Advocates of orthodox theories of law are not
considered legal pluralists even if they explicitly recognize LP.7 It seems that, as
an academic tradition, most of those who self-style as legal pluralists accept this
double commitment, namely, a factual claim (i.e., the recognition of LP) and a
combative element (i.e., the opposition to mainstream theories of law). Furthermore, because self-identiﬁcation does not deﬁne the legal pluralist tradition, its
advocates have not hesitated to attach the label to scholars who did not explicitly
identify as such. For example, authors such as Eugene Ehrlich, Santi Romano,
Bronislaw Malinowski, Karl Llewellyn and Edward Hoebel, Lon Fuller, Leopold
Pospisil, and Robert Cover did not use the label “pluralism” but are often characterized as forerunners or representatives of the tradition because their work studied
LP and opposed the mainstream views of the legal theory of their time. For similar
reasons, I will discuss below Brian Tamanaha as a participant of the intellectual
tradition, despite being critical of the principal pluralist discourse. In sum, I call
“legal pluralists” or “the legal pluralist tradition” those who endorse this double
commitment (recognition of LP and opposition to orthodox theories) irrespective
of whether they self-identify as such.

2. The Myth of Centralism
Pluralists attribute the centralist view they oppose to “orthodox,” “mainstream,” or
“dominant” theories of law, such as those of Hans Kelsen, H.L.A. Hart, and Joseph
Raz. I will refer to these theories as analytical jurisprudence, that is, the theoretical
inquiry concerned with explaining the fundamental features of law and legal
concepts. As a consequence of this centralist commitment, pluralists argue, jurisprudents have remained focused on state law. In contrast, pluralists have identiﬁed
and studied a constellation of non-state legal phenomena, such as customs,
indigenous laws, norms of associations and unions, transnational and global laws
of diﬀerent kinds, whose existence is independent of the laws of the state. Due to
this unawareness of normative diversity, some pluralists hold that the kind of work
that legal theorists attempt “is simply out of date and can be safely ignored.”8 Others
deny any explanatory value to centralist theoretical insights, for the constellation of
non-state legal phenomena “can only be adequately explained by a theory of legal
pluralism.”9
Most jurisprudents have remained indiﬀerent to the pluralist objection. When
they choose to engage with it, they retort that such accusation is a systematic
7
8

9

For example, Keith C. Culver and Michael Giudice, Legality’s Borders: An Essay in General
Jurisprudence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
John Griﬃths, “Legal Pluralism and the Theory of Legislation—With Special Reference to the
Regulation of Euthanasia,” in Legal Polycentricity: Consequences of Pluralism in Law, ed. Henrik
Petersen and Hahle Zahle (Dartmouth: Ashgate, 1995), 201.
Gunther Teubner, “‘Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society,” in Global Law
Without a State, ed. Gunther Teubner (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997), 4.
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misrepresentation of their views. While “centralism” can describe the ideas of some
legal and political philosophers of the nineteenth century and some lawyers and
legal scholars of the twentieth century, jurisprudents argue that it does not
represent the views of most important contemporary scholars.10 For example,
Hans Kelsen explicitly characterized as law the norms of ancient Babylonians,
African tribes (e.g., the Ashantis in West Africa), and contemporary states, despite
their vast diﬀerences, because they share “the social technique which consists in
bringing about the desired social conduct of men through the threat of a measure of
coercion which is to be applied in case of contrary conduct.”11 Despite some
problematic language, Kelsen explicitly recognizes as law both modern state law
and forms of “primitive, pre-state” legal phenomena that have not achieved the
centralized coercion characteristic of states.12
Similarly, while certain statements in Hart’s theory seem to justify a centralist
reading, nothing in his account precludes its application to non-state legal phenomena. For Hart, a legal system contains “secondary rules,” namely, standards
regulating the identiﬁcation, creation, and application of rules and oﬃcials in
charge of those tasks.13 Many scholars recognize that it is possible to identify
oﬃcials and secondary rules, and thereby legal systems, beyond the state even if
Hart did not explicitly recognize this possibility.14 Forms of indigenous, customary,
religious, international, and transnational law could be considered legal systems if
the required secondary rules are present. Some critics have suggested that the
problem with Hart’s theory is not statism but over-inclusiveness.15 For these critics,
Hart’s theory objectionably recognizes as legal practices associations, clubs, sports,
and universities if they exhibit the hallmarks of a legal system, which for some
writers excessively expands the domain of legal pluralism.
Even Raz, who oﬀers the most explicit defence of statism, allows for non-state
legal phenomena. For example, he claimed that legal systems are part of the
normative orders of “complex forms of social life, such as religions, states, regimes,
tribes, etc.”16 He also recognized international law and church law as non-central

10
11
12

13
14

15
16

Gardner, Law as a Leap of Faith, chap. 11; Gardner, What Is Legal Pluralism?; Muñiz-Fraticelli, The
Structure of Pluralism, chap. 6; MacAmhlaigh, “Does Legal Theory Have a Pluralism Problem?”
Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, trans. Andrew Wedberg (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1945), 19.
Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory: A Translation of the First Edition of the “Reine
Rechtslehre” or Pure Theory of Law, trans. Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 99.
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, ed. Joseph Raz and Penelope Bulloch, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 2012), chap. v.
See, e.g., Neil MacCormick, “Beyond the Sovereign State,” The Modern Law Review 56, no. 1 (1993):
5–6; Jeremy Waldron, “Legal Pluralism and the Contrast between Hart’s Jurisprudence and
Fuller’s,” in The Hart–Fuller Debate in the 21st Century, ed. Peter Cane (Oxford: Hart, 2010),
135–55; Detlef von Daniels, The Concept of Law from a Transnational Perspective (Aldershot:
Ashgate, 2010), chap. 6; Mariano Croce, “A Practice Theory of Legal Pluralism: Hart’s
(Inadvertent) Defence of the Indistinctiveness of Law,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence
27 (2014): 27–47; Muñiz-Fraticelli, The Structure of Pluralism, chap. 7; Thomas Schultz, Transnational Legality: Stateless Law and International Arbitration (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
USA, 2014), chap. 5.
Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Realistic Theory of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 48.
Joseph Raz, The Concept of a Legal System, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 188.
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instances of law,17 and more recently, he also acknowledged an array of non-state
legal phenomena, including European Union law, canon law, sharia law, indigenous laws, rules of corporations, voluntary associations, and—more controversially
—neighbourhood gangs.18
These three examples leave clear that contemporary jurisprudents are not
“centralist” in the sense the pluralist tradition construes them. Their theories allow
some forms of coexistence and interaction of diﬀerent state and non-state legal
orders; therefore, they are compatible with LP. This explains why these jurisprudents have claimed that the pluralist objection suﬀers from a defect called antonym
substitution, in which they replace jurisprudential ideas with “antonyms of their
own choosing, which [they] either ignored or explicitly rejected.”19 Others have
similarly argued that the pluralist position suﬀers from “straw man syndrome,”
which is the “inclination to caricature competing visions so as to dismantle them
more easily.”20 Once the confusions and caricatures are cleared up, jurisprudents
claim to be able to apply their richer conceptual toolkits to address the pluralist’s
concerns, among others, empirical inquiries concerning the identiﬁcation of the
variety of legal phenomena, doctrinal questions concerning the application of
norms, and some politico-moral inquiries about their legitimacy and authority.

3. The Challenge of Non-State Legal Phenomena
I believe that the jurisprudential response to the objections of the legal pluralist
tradition is fundamentally correct. However, in concentrating on defending their
tradition against the pluralists’ mistaken readings, jurisprudents have set aside
signiﬁcant issues raised by pluralist scholars.
Importantly, in its studies of LP and its empirical, doctrinal, and politico-moral
consequences, the legal pluralist tradition has highlighted and attempted to explain
the existence and operation of putative forms of legal phenomena diﬀerent from the
legal systems of domestic states. Prominent examples of non-state legal phenomena,
as we can generally call them, include customary law, the traditional norms and
methods of dispute resolution that govern the life of many groups of the Global
South; indigenous law, the norms and institutions of the more than 5,000 indigenous peoples of the world; community-made or unoﬃcial laws created to address
issues that state law is unable or unwilling to resolve; and religious law, the
institutionalized norms regulating civil and criminal aﬀairs of major religious
systems, such as canon law, sharia, or Jewish law, which remain operative even
when not recognized by domestic law. Another example is transnational law,
namely, private- and public–private complexes of norms that attempt to regulate
17

18
19
20

Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 150;
Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2009), 105.
Joseph Raz, “Why the State?,” in In Pursuit of Pluralist Jurisprudence, ed. Nicole Roughan and
Andrew Halpin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 136–62.
Muñiz-Fraticelli, The Structure of Pluralism, 125.
Valcke, “Three Perils of Legal Pluralism,” 126; cf. Otto Pfersmann, “Contre le pluralisme mondialisationnaliste: pour un monisme juridique ouvert et diﬀérencié,” Archiv für rechts-und sozialphilosophie, ARSP. Beiheft, no. 121 (2010): 138.
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issues beyond and across state borders, such as transnational commercial law, lex
digitalis and multinational enterprises. One ﬁnal example is the interesting but
vague claims concerning the existence of some putative global, world, or cosmopolitan legal phenomena—namely, forms of legal regulation with planetary inﬂuence, outside of the control of the nation-state or any other authority.21
These phenomena, in turn, draw attention to two problems within extant legal
theories. First, the standard accounts of analytical jurisprudence have focused on
studying exclusively state law, thereby ignoring possible instances of non-state law
that regulate millions of people on issues of the utmost moral, social, and political
importance. In some cases, non-state norms are the operating rules that actually
guide a community’s life (e.g., customary laws in some countries) or are the laws
with which the community truly identiﬁes (e.g., many indigenous communities
prefer their laws over state law) while state norms are merely paper rules. These
norms now regulate a diversity of issues beyond the control of individual nationstates, ranging from the more urgent topics of our time (e.g., human rights, crimes
against humanity, migration, war and peace, trade, and environmental degradation) to seemingly “mundane” and “unexciting” subjects (e.g., banking, telecommunications, cross-border taxation, investments, and sanitary and phytosanitary
measures), which are nonetheless critical to “sustaining our life.”22 In a word,
extant theories of law have neglected a signiﬁcant part of the pre-theoretical data
they should consider.
More importantly, extant theories might be structurally incapable of explaining
the distinctive nature of non-state legal phenomena. Most standard theories of
analytical jurisprudence depart from the assumption of the explanatory centrality
of the state law over other forms of legality. For example, Hart claimed that “the
clear standard cases” of law are “constituted by the legal systems of modern states,
which no one in his senses doubts are legal systems.”23 Similarly, Raz embraces the
“assumption of the importance of municipal law,” that is, the “intuitive perception
that municipal legal systems are suﬃciently important and suﬃciently diﬀerent
from most other normative systems to deserve being studied for their own sake.”24
Per this methodological approach, the standard theories posit state law as the
central case of legality and view non-state legal phenomena as types of law that lack
crucial elements of the paradigm (e.g., oﬃcials, normative hierarchies, and supremacy claims). Consequently, while these theories can recognize non-state phenomena as law, these practices are often described as non-central, borderline,
incomplete forms of law, if not deviant, defective, or pathological. Per this
approach, non-state law can be indirectly illuminated by extrapolating from the
theory of the central case.25

21
22
23
24
25

For a catalogue of non-state legal phenomena, see Jorge Luis Fabra-Zamora, ed., “Introduction,” in
Jurisprudence in a Globalized Context (Cheltenham, UK: Elgar Publishing, 2020), 1–12.
Jeremy Waldron, “Cosmopolitan Norms,” in Seyla Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism,
ed. Robert Post (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 83–84.
Hart, The Concept of Law, 4.
Raz, The Authority of Law, 109.
Hart, The Concept of Law, 4–5, 15–16; Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, 150; Raz, The Authority of
Law, 105.
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By contrast, pluralist scholars hold that indigenous, customary, unoﬃcial, and
religious laws are not secondary, incomplete, or watered-down state law; they are
forms of law in their own and distinct way. Similarly, according to many theorists,
forms of autonomous types of transnational law distinctively operate without any
state intervention.26 That is, non-state legal scholars have highlighted a diﬀerent set
of putative phenomena that lack some of the features of state law but are nonetheless suﬃciently important, uniﬁed in form, and distinctive and thereby merit
direct theoretical attention.

III. Methodological Considerations
The pluralists’ claims about putative forms of non-state legal phenomena and the
problems of the extant accounts they signal should be taken seriously by philosophers and theoretically interested scholars. However, since legal pluralists aim to
challenge the adequacy of mainstream legal theories, often without oﬀering comprehensive alternatives, a serious discussion of LP requires returning to the storied
conceptual question, “What is law?”—the central concern that interests analytical
jurisprudence. To determine whether there is a scenario of legal pluralism with
more than one legal phenomenon in a given situation, and not merely normative
pluralism, we must have ﬁrst determined what the relevant phenomena are,
whether they are legal objects, and how they diﬀer from non-legal objects. In other
words, to engage with LP in a non-question-begging manner, we need some
resolution to the conceptual question of analytical jurisprudence, i.e., the features
that explain the legal character of a given normative practice and the elements that
illuminate how to distinguish between legal and non-legal phenomena.
However, we should be careful. The conceptual question about law by itself is
too vague and too general to be useful, and it is unclear what would count as a
proper response. For many legal pluralists, we can address it by providing a new
deﬁnition of law—namely, linguistic formulas that diﬀerentiate between state and
non-state normative objects appropriately marked by the word “law” from other
phenomena marked by diﬀerent words. For example, Michaels claims that the
“deﬁnition of law” is one of the “central questions of legal pluralism.”27 This
methodological strategy assumes that the word “law” has some correct or proper
meaning that can be deﬁned. However, it is widely accepted in jurisprudential
circles that the unqualiﬁed search for a real or per genus et diﬀerentiam deﬁnition of
law was put to rest by Hart.28 As far as I know, pluralists have not yet responded to
Hart’s concerns.
By contrast, many contemporary legal philosophers suggest that the proper
response to the conceptual question entails developing an account of the nature of

26
27
28

Teubner, “‘Global Bukowina.’”
Michaels, “Global Legal Pluralism,” 251.
Hart, The Concept of Law, 13–14; H.L.A. Hart, “Deﬁnition and Theory in Jurisprudence,” in Essays
in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 33–35.
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law in terms of a set of necessary features.29 However, these sorts of analyses run
into trouble when explaining non-state legal phenomena. Some of these philosophers claimed to be interested only in the “narrow usage” of the concept-term law
limited to state law.30 When facing disputed cases of putative forms of non-state
legal phenomena, others decide that they are “a bit like a legal system in some senses
and not in others and leave it like that.”31 In doing so, they leave unﬁlled their
promise of providing an account of the necessary features of law.
I believe that neither of these familiar strategies satisfactorily address the
concerns raised by the existence of putative forms of non-state legal phenomena.
Instead, I shall adumbrate an alternative approach inspired by Hart in which the
purpose of a general theory of law is to improve our understanding of law by
providing an “explanatory and clarifying account of law as a social and political
phenomenon.”32 I shall refer to this model as Hartian to avoid exegetical disputes
about the best interpretation of Hart’s work.

1. Hartian Methodology
Hart famously noticed that the question, “What is law?” is puzzling for two
contrasting reasons.33 On the one hand, philosophers, lawyers, and empirical
scholars radically disagree on the proper resolution of the question and often
advance diverse and contradictory attempts to resolve it. However strange and
paradoxical they sometimes sound, their proposed solutions are not mere attempts
to deny the “plainest deliveries of common sense” but are the result of prolonged
reﬂection by serious thinkers attempting to illuminate the phenomenon by
highlighting explanatorily salient features.34
The disputes among experts contrast, on the other hand, with the capacity of
most ordinary citizens to identify examples of law and to provide a skeleton account
of them (they can say, for instance, that law comprises rules about behaviour,
confers powers, and involves courts and legislatures). Hart rejected the possibility
of preserving this skeleton account as the deﬁnitive answer. For him, such an
account not only is incomplete (for example, because courts and legislature are
creatures of legal rules, a detailed theory must explain how such institutions come
into existence) but also fails to address the source of their puzzlement: “those who
are most perplexed by the question ‘What is law?’ have not forgotten and need no
reminder of the familiar facts which this skeleton answer oﬀers them.”35 That is to
say that disagreement among experts is not the result of ignorance, the forgetting of
basic facts, or the inability to recognize accepted phenomena as law.
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In this context, Hart advises that “the best course is to defer giving any answer to
the query ‘What is law?’ until we have found out what it is that has in fact puzzled
those who have asked or attempted to answer it, even though their familiarity with
law and their ability to recognize examples are beyond question. What more do
they want to know and why do they want to know it?”36 On this approach, to
address the conceptual question, we need to identify the central puzzles and
disputes among experts, who are divided on how to account for legal phenomena
even though they can identify clear instances of law. These puzzles “are not
graciously chosen or invented for the pleasure of academic discussion,” Hart says,
but they “concern aspects of law which seem naturally, at all times, to give rise to
misunderstandings, so that confusion and a consequent need for greater clarity
about them may coexist even in the minds of thoughtful men with a ﬁrm mastery of
knowledge of the law.”37 Thus, we need to identify and attempt to resolve the most
critical and recurrent puzzles, misunderstandings, and disagreements between
experts. By resolving these puzzles, we start to obtain a clearer picture of the main
features of this legal phenomenon. This is the explanatory-clarifying account of law,
an elucidation that resolves the core misunderstandings and obscuring myths
clustered around law.

2. Non-State Legal Phenomena
The Hartian description of the initial perplexity of legal theory can be adapted to
articulate the challenges created by the pluralist’s identiﬁcation of putative forms of
non-state legal phenomena. Here, lawyers, empirical scholars, and philosophers
have advanced contrasting catalogues and accounts that locate phenomena diﬀerent from state law as clear and central instances of law. These claims do not seek to
doubt common sense. They are the outcome of the sustained study of serious
thinkers who cannot be deemed as ignorant, forgetful, or conceptually confused
about law even if they are unfamiliar with some nuances of state-centred theories of
law. Still, because these claims do not come with a novel theory of law and are partly
at odds with the standard accounts, we end up with serious disagreements on
foundational issues.
Scholars have contrasting intuitions on selecting the pre-theoretically relevant
phenomena, the features that make up their legal nature, and how we should
explain them. The puzzles are not mere philosophical divertimentos, but their
resolution is necessary to achieve greater clarity about a central social phenomenon
and guide theoretical and practical inquiries about it. For example, pluralists’
doctrinal explorations of the use of non-state norms in the resolution of disputes
presuppose, albeit perhaps only implicitly, a working answer to the conceptual
question. Similarly, pluralists’ politico-moral inquiries need a working understanding of law to inquire into authority, justice, legitimacy, and the obedience that
subjects owe to these norms. Finally, empirical projects need some basic account of
law to identify the relevant phenomena and to describe how they operate and
36
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inﬂuence their social context or are inﬂuenced by it. In this sense, the theoretical
question about law is unavoidable; if it is not resolved before starting empirical,
politico-moral, or doctrinal inquiries, it will return through the backdoor when
justifying a certain account, resolving diﬃcult cases, or providing ﬁne-grained
details. This does not mean that the project of general jurisprudence is explanatorily
prior to all other inquiries. In my view, the role of the explanatory-clarifying theory
is to provide a preliminary account that serves as a starting point; this initial
account can, in turn, be complemented, reﬁned, and revised in light of more speciﬁc
doctrinal, empirical, or normative ﬁndings.
In sum, for the Hartian, the purpose of legal theory is to solve some primary and
recurrent puzzles, confusions, and misunderstandings about law. The resolution of
these questions results in an instructive explanatory account, diﬀerent from
deﬁnitions and analysis in terms of necessary conditions, that seeks to illuminate
the main features of the phenomena and create a stable point of departure for
further empirical, doctrinal, and politico-moral studies.

IV. Three Problems
In keeping with the Hartian explanatory-clarifying proposal, I will isolate some
central and recurrent puzzles highlighted by the legal pluralist tradition. In my
view, these puzzles concern the common features or generalities that all instances of
law share, the distinction between legal and non-legal phenomena, and the explanatory centrality of the state. The competing positions in each of these puzzles will be
identiﬁed, along with some relationships and diﬀerences among them.

1. The Common Features of Law
The ﬁrst and most important problem can be introduced using one of Hart’s
methodological formulations. He suggested that “[law], in spite of many variations
in diﬀerent cultures and in diﬀerent times, has taken the same general form and
structure, though many misunderstandings and obscuring myths, calling for
clariﬁcation, have clustered around it.”38 Elsewhere, Hart also claimed that law is
“a form of social institution with a normative aspect, which in its recurrence in
diﬀerent societies and periods exhibits many common features of form, structure,
and content.”39 In these passages, Hart calls our attention to some common features
or generalities shared by all types of law in diﬀerent cultures and diﬀerent times.
Hart presupposes that such features exist and that it is the role of legal theory to
explain them. Here, I shall call uniﬁed accounts of law all those theories that, like
Hart’s, attempt to identify the common features of legality.40
38
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The common features of law can recast the challenge generated by the pluralists’ pre-theoretical identiﬁcation of instances of non-state legal phenomena. A
great deal of the discourse about non-state law and legal pluralism presupposes
(albeit implicitly) the existence of these generalities, such that any object that
exhibits certain features is an instance of law. John Griﬃths expresses this commitment to the uniﬁed features as follows: “Any sort of ‘pluralism’ necessarily
implies that more than one of the sorts of the thing concerned is present within the
ﬁeld described. In the case of legal pluralism, more than one law must be present.”41
For Griﬃths, diﬀerent forms of non-state legal phenomena are diﬀerent instances
of the same thing. When pluralists identify putative forms of non-state law, they
could be taken as suggesting that these objects exemplify some of the common
features that allow us to characterize them as an instance of law. Similarly, when
pluralist scholars criticize state-centric theories, this could be taken as suggesting
that these familiar accounts are incomplete or defective because they fail to
adequately capture and explain instances of non-state law and therefore should
be replaced by alternative explanations that accommodate all the relevant data.
Proponents of the legal pluralist tradition, however, have had problems in
articulating and making explicit their uniﬁed account. As we suggested above, they
often advanced underdeveloped, ad hoc deﬁnitional accounts that fail to address
Hart’s concerns. Furthermore, other pluralists have not even articulated uniﬁed
accounts at all. Griﬃths’s and Sally Engle Merry’s canonical formulations of legal
pluralism, for example, rely on Sally Falk Moore’s account of a “semi-autonomous
social ﬁeld,” which is a societal sector that “can generate rules and […] induce
compliance to them” while remaining “vulnerable to […] other forces emanating
from the larger world by which it is surrounded.”42 However, as Tamanaha
repeatedly noted, Moore did not provide what I call a uniﬁed account of law but
a general theory of social structures.43 The lack of a successful uniﬁed theory in law,
in my view, justiﬁes critics of legal pluralism who argue that the tradition is “banal”
or “point[s] to nothing” distinctive because “it merely reminds us that from the
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legal perspective (as from any other) isolated, homogeneous societies do not
actually exist.”44
However, the analytical components of other pluralists’ empirical and doctrinal
projects about non-state legal phenomena have constructed substantive accounts of
the central features of legality. Notable examples include Boaventura Sousa Santos’s
conception of law as bodies of justiciable procedures and standards,45 Gunther
Teubner’s understanding of law as self-generated discourses that use the binary
code legal/illegal and include institutionalized processes of secondary
rulemaking,46 and Emmanuel Melissaris’s characterization of law in terms of
people’s shared normative experiences.47 Although very diﬀerent in their theoretical ambitions, all three forms share an underlying commitment: the multiplicity of
legal orders they identify are fundamentally diverse kinds of the same thing.
In contrast, some members of the pluralist tradition reject such a commitment.
For them, the core of pluralism is not merely that there exists a “multiplicity” or
“plurality” of the same uniform phenomena, as Griﬃths’ argued, but that there are
a variety of multifarious phenomena with diﬀerent distinctive features or which
reﬂect diﬀerent rationalities or cultural conceptions that cannot be explained by a
single overarching account of law. I will refer to this second approach as fragmentary accounts of law. The best-articulated version of the fragmentary position is
advanced by Tamanaha, who develops a conventionalist understanding in which
“law is whatever we attach the label ‘law’ to.”48 On this view, communities attach
the label “law” to a cornucopia of objects, including state law, international law,
transnational law, indigenous law, natural law, the law of sub-state organizations
(states, provinces, etc.), religious law, and soft law. These are, for Tamanaha, “quite
diﬀerent phenomena, sometimes involving institutions or systems, sometimes not;
sometimes connected to concrete patterns of behaviour, sometimes not; sometimes
using force, sometimes not.”49 As a result, they are not a “multiplicity of one basic
phenomenon” that co-regulate the life of contemporary agents, but they are instead
diﬀerent kinds of objects that we happen to label with the same word: “each one of
these does many diﬀerent things and/or is used to do many things.”50 Like
Tamanaha, other pluralists deny the existence of uniﬁed features. For example,
Margaret Davies suggests that contemporary legal pluralism rejects the “dogma of
the singularity of the concept of law,”51 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott holds that law is not
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to be understood as “homogenous, insular and closed but instead to encompass
very plural entities and diverse opportunities,”52 and Franz and Keebet von BendaBeckmann depict law as “a generic term that comprises a variety of social phenomena (concepts, rules, principles, procedures, regulations of diﬀerent sorts,
relationships, decisions) at diﬀerent levels of social organization.”53
With these clariﬁcations, we have identiﬁed some points of controversy among
experts generated by the pre-theoretical identiﬁcation of non-state legal phenomena. On the one hand, there is a dispute between several legal pluralist uniﬁed
accounts of the common features of law. These views compete amongst themselves
and also conﬂict with the fragmentary project. Notably, fragmentary legal pluralists
not only attack the uniﬁed theories of law provided by analytical jurisprudents but
also reject any uniﬁed account, including those advanced by other legal pluralists.
Indeed, the fragmentary approaches of Tamanaha, Davies, Douglas-Scott, and von
Benda-Beckmann attack the uniﬁed projects of Sousa, Teubner, and Melissaris. In
this sense, paying attention to the uniﬁed features of law also allows us to uncover a
critical yet neglected intramural tension within the pluralist tradition.54 Each of
these proposals faces distinctive challenges. Uniﬁed legal pluralists must develop
illuminating accounts of the general features of legality that address the fragmentary project’s concerns (i.e., inasmuch as such features exist, are meaningful, and
are epistemically accessible). Moreover, each uniﬁed account must demonstrate
that its particular account compares favourably with other competing theories.
Fragmentary accounts of law must, in turn, explain how they identify some objects
as instances of law while excluding others. Thus, we have transformed the abstract
question, “What is ‘law’?” required to identify LP into a more focused and
manageable debate between uniﬁed and fragmentary accounts.

2. The Distinctiveness of Law
The second problem concerns the distinction between legal and non-legal phenomena. Despite their defects, state-centric theories provided an operative form of
the distinction. Setting borderline cases aside, traditional theories have restricted
the legal domain to the norms that state oﬃcials create, practice, and recognize.
These legal norms contrast with the non-legal norms that lack oﬃcial imprimatur,
such as those of etiquette, associations, groups, clubs, academic institutions, dating,
the exchange of gifts, religious rites, or aesthetic judgment. However, once pluralists
open Pandora’s box of non-state law and call into question the state-centric
account, the distinction between legal phenomena and social objects traditionally
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considered as non-legal phenomena risks collapse. That is, if the state no longer
oﬀers the mark of legality, a new distinction between legal and non-legal normative
phenomena, if any, must be established.
This issue has held centre stage in the literature on legal pluralism. For example,
Merry discusses the problem as follows:
Why is it so diﬃcult to ﬁnd a word for non-state law? It is clearly diﬃcult to
deﬁne and circumscribe these forms of ordering. Where do we stop speaking
of law and ﬁnd ourselves simply describing social life? Is it useful to call all
these forms of ordering law? In writing about legal pluralism, I ﬁnd that once
legal centralism has been vanquished, calling all forms of ordering that are
not state law by the term law confounds the analysis.55

Similarly, Tamanaha calls this “Malinowski’s problem,”56 Baudouin Dupret
talks about the “deﬁnitional deadlock,”57 and William Twinning calls it the
“problem of the deﬁnitional stop.”58 Here, pluralists are divided into two groups.
Non-distinctivist theories, on the one hand, ﬁnd no sharp and illuminating
distinction between legal and non-legal forms of social normativity. For example,
Marc Galanter suggested that law can be found in “universities, sports leagues,
housing developments, hospitals, etc.,” and John Griﬃths claimed that “all forms of
social control are more or less legal.”59 In a similar vein, Boaventura de Sousa Santos
shifts the burden of proof: “It might be asked: why should these competing or
complementary forms of social ordering be designated as law and not rather as ‘rule
systems,’ ‘private governments’ and so on? Posed in these terms, the questions can
only be answered by another: Why not?”60
By contrast, distinctivist accounts posit a diﬀerence between legal and non-legal
normative phenomena and seek to clarify it. For example, Teubner has explicitly
claimed that the legal proprium is limited to autopoietic (i.e., self-creating) forms of
discourse that deﬁne actions as legal or illegal,61 Melissaris grounded the legal
practices on “shared normative commitments,”62 and Mariano Croce has stipulated that no common feature can distinguish law from non-law, so we should
identify as law a distinctive and specialized form of knowledge that claims to be selfsuﬃcient and separate from common knowledge.63 To be clear, claims about the
putative distinction between law and non-law are also part of the repository of
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fragmentary approaches. Tamanaha holds that the only available explanation of the
distinction is a conventionalist one, i.e., “law is whatever we happen to call ‘law.’”64
While there are many other views in the literature, this selective exposition
suﬃces to show the existence of signiﬁcant debates among legal pluralists about the
distinction between legal and non-legal phenomena. Distinctivist and nondistinctivist pluralist accounts of law disagree about the possibility of drawing a
meaningful and illuminating distinction. Moreover, there is an intramural dispute
amongst distinctivist scholars about the best explanation of the diﬀerence. Each of
these two positions has its challenges. Non-distinctivist approaches must demonstrate that their view does not trivialize legal phenomena and that it illuminates
further inquiries. They need to justify why we should categorize as law the norms of
universities, sports leagues, and housing developments, along with state law and
European Union law, and why this informs further debates (e.g., about the
application or legitimacy of legal rules). The distinctivist project, on the other
hand, needs to develop a proper account of the uniﬁed features that correctly
captures the relevant phenomena—one that is not over- nor under-inclusive—and
each speciﬁc approach also needs to demonstrate that their particular formulation
of the distinction is more illuminating than the alternatives.

3. The Centrality of the State
The third question concerns the explanatory centrality of state law. As noted above,
members of analytical jurisprudence suggest not only that the state is an important
political arrangement but also that it deserves an important role in our accounts of
law. Some members of the pluralist tradition endorse a similar position. For
example, Roger Cotterrell treats “state law as central to but not the exclusive
concern of analysis of law in contemporary Western society,”65 André-Jean
Arnaud66 discusses a multiplicity of “juridical systems” while reserving the term
“law” for state law, and Dennis Galligan assigns a central role to the state over nonstate phenomena.67 As Moore suggests, these pluralists attempt to distinguish
between state and “other rulemaking entities” for purposes of analysis and policy
without “necessarily adopting a ‘legal centralist’ view.”68 However, other legal
pluralists, such as Griﬃths and Tamanaha, forcefully reject this positioning of state
law “as the standard and measure of legality.”69 For these scholars, non-state legal
phenomena are not merely non-central secondary, incomplete, or watered-down
state law and state law is one form of legal phenomena among many without any
special place in legal theory.
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Thus, we have shifted towards a new dispute diﬀerent from the accusations of
centralism and monism that have partly deﬁned legal pluralism as an academic
tradition. Using Griﬃths’s language,70 we can characterize it as the dispute between
“weak” and “strong” advocates of LP: the former assign explanatory centrality to
the state, whereas the latter deny such centrality. The question about the centrality
and role of the state in our legal theories, often called “methodological nationalism”
or “statism” in other disciplines,71 is a central inquiry that needs to be addressed
because of the recognition of the facts of plurality and pluralism.
Again, each of these two positions has its challenges. Statist pluralism needs to
demonstrate that the state still has a substantive central role in regulating contemporary life and that certain substantive and methodological implications follow
from that position without distorting non-state legal phenomena. By contrast, nonstatists should show either that statism is not the best description of our current
practices or that the implications that statist scholars extract are not warranted.
Some scholars have made a case for new central phenomena. For example, one can
argue non-state legal norms are central because state sovereignty and the prominent role played by the state in the contemporary world could be seen as a creation
of non-state norms (e.g., the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of
States, the Vienna Convention of Treaties, and the UN Charter).72 More radically,
some proponents of so-called global legal pluralism claim that a “Copernican
revolution” has occurred in legal thought: some non-state legal phenomena—
perhaps international law, human rights, or some global constitutional norms—
now occupy the place that the state once had as the centre of the legal universe.73

V. Main Consequences
The previous section identiﬁed three problems highlighted by the legal pluralist
tradition: the common features of law, the distinction between law and non-law,
and the centrality of the state. This section argues that recognizing this trio of
problems aﬀects the deﬁnition and agenda of analytical jurisprudence and legal
pluralism, as well as the possibility of a reconciliation between the two approaches.

1. The Agenda of Analytical Jurisprudence
Until today, analytical jurisprudents have felt free to ignore the pluralist tradition
or merely attempt to correct the pluralists’ misrepresentations of their work.
Moreover, when they choose to engage with the questions of legal pluralism,
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jurisprudents do so in terms of their own theories. However, I think that recognizing this trio of problems should modify the agenda of analytical jurisprudence in
three crucial respects.
First, analytical jurisprudence needs to recognize pluralists’ uniﬁed accounts of
law. It would be a mistake if mainstream legal theorists dismissed the analytical
components proposed by legal pluralists as non-philosophical or assumed that
their own theories have the upper hand. These analytical components, while
developed for speciﬁc inquiries, outline accounts of the common features that all
forms of state and non-state law share and can be compared with the standard
accounts of jurisprudence advanced by Hart, Raz, and Kelsen on several theoretical
standards, such as simplicity, coherence, consilience, and generality. For example, if
pluralist accounts could explain both state and non-state law, we would have a
reason to reject the extant theories of analytical jurisprudence that have assigned a
secondary role to non-state legal phenomena.
Second, it is critical to note that fragmentary legal pluralism levies the clearest
and most thorough challenge against the possibility of analytical jurisprudence—
one that has not yet been adequately answered. While analytical jurisprudence
attempts to identify some basic features present in all forms of legal phenomena,
fragmentary pluralists claim that manifestations of law cannot be reduced to one
single uniﬁed account.74 Finally, by challenging the explanatory centrality of the
state, non-statist pluralists do not merely claim that the extant theories “leave out
too much”75 data that they should consider. Instead, the key claim is that the extant
jurisprudential accounts might be structurally incapable of explaining the distinctive legal character of non-state forms of normativity.
As a result, analytical jurisprudents do not monopolize the conceptual questions about law. To borrow from Michael Oakeshott, if to be a “philosopher” is not a
matter of holding certain doctrines but “having submitted [one]self to a particular
kind of curiosity” and providing “ordered systems of answers” to the questions this
curiosity creates,76 the claims of legal pluralists count as forms of legal philosophy.
Pluralists have contributed to this project by highlighting critical evidence that
challenges well-established assumptions and introduces novel and sophisticated
accounts. The fact that some pluralists are skeptical of the conceptual questions is
not an obstacle for this engagement. Because the denial of metaphysical thinking is
itself a form of metaphysics, as F. H. Bradley suggested, jurisprudents should
consider the pluralist skeptics as fellow theorists with a diﬀerent understanding
of the fundamental principles.77 In a word, then, jurisprudents should take legal
pluralism seriously.
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2. Pluralist Empirical, Doctrinal, and Politico-Moral Inquiries
Awareness of this trio of problems aﬀects the inquiries that legal pluralist advance.
As suggested above, to determine whether there is a scenario of legal pluralism with
more than one legal phenomenon in a given situation, and not merely normative
pluralism, we must have ﬁrst determined what the relevant phenomena are and
whether they are legal objects. In this sense, to fruitfully engage with LP in a nonquestion-begging manner, we must be aware of the existence of the puzzles
surrounding the common features and distinctiveness of law and the centrality
of the state. It is diﬃcult to identify and describe norms (empirical inquiries), apply
them to speciﬁc contexts (doctrinal inquiries), or assess their legitimacy or justice
(politico-moral inquiries) without a provisional understanding of what law is. In
advancing this working understanding, pluralists should not adjudicate in a
principled manner the disputes between uniﬁed and fragmentary accounts, distinctivist and non-distinctivist accounts, and statist and non-statist projects.
Consequently, pluralists should overcome their contrived attitudes to the
conceptual inquiries that interest analytical jurisprudents. As suggested here,
jurisprudence does not entail centralism or certain disciplinary pedigree; it is
simply the project of providing a general answer to the conceptual question, “What
is law?” The tradition of legal pluralism has contributed to this project by
highlighting pre-theoretical data and developing views on each of the three
problems. In my opinion, those conceptual contributions should not be advanced
covertly or inadvertently. It would be more eﬀective if pluralists engaged in some of
the debates of the mainstream jurisprudential tradition to clarify and contrast their
conceptual claims and uncover the assumptions on which they are based. In other
words, instead of opposing the project of jurisprudence, legal pluralists should
embrace them as a necessary and valuable component of their explanatory and
normative agendas.

3. The Possibility of Reconciliation
Finally, these considerations allow us to revisit the possibility of reconciliation
between analytical jurisprudence and legal pluralism. “The analytical positivists
and the empirical pluralists are not adversaries,” Maks Del Mar writes, “they are
better thought of as partners, though so far they have been like diﬀerent groups of
blind persons pointing to diﬀerent parts of the same elephant.”78 A cooperative
project, sometimes called “pluralist jurisprudence” or “pluralist positivism,” which
is sensitive to the evidence and the methodological, doctrinal, and politico-moral
concerns of the legal pluralist tradition, has emerged as a possible solution to the
conﬂict.79
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While pluralist jurisprudence has successfully challenged the state-centric
assumptions of mainstream theories,80 in my view, it has failed to address the full
extent of the questions raised by the pluralist tradition. Like mainstream jurisprudents, pluralist jurisprudents depart from the standard uniﬁed and distinctivist
accounts of law. Nicole Roughan and Andrew Halpin’s “candidate pluralist theory
of law,” for example, discusses features such as the openness or decisiveness of law
taken directly from the standard accounts.81 Still, to properly engage with the
conceptual questions raised by the pluralist tradition, jurisprudents should not only
widen their purview to new phenomena but also consider the pluralist intuitions
and their candidate uniﬁed accounts developed for non-state legal phenomena.
Furthermore, the possibility of a pluralist analytical jurisprudence, as Roughan and
Halpin depict it, presupposes the defensibility of a uniﬁed and distinctivist account
of law that adequately incorporates both state and non-state legal phenomena.
Consequently, a successful pluralist jurisprudence needs to consider and respond to
the challenge of fragmentary legal pluralism and establish a plausible distinction
between law and non-law.

VI. Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that jurisprudents have not fully considered the
theoretical puzzles discussed by the intellectual tradition of legal pluralism. Here,
I identiﬁed the three main puzzles. First, the question of the commonalities shared
by all forms of law, disputed by uniﬁed and fragmentary accounts (i.e., what are, if
any, the key explanatory and illuminating common features of form, structure, and
content between the state and non-state phenomena that theorists have pretheoretically identiﬁed as law?). Second, the distinction between legal and nonlegal phenomena, where contenders are demarcationist and non-demarcationist
projects (i.e., what are, if any, the features that allow us to diﬀerentiate between legal
and non-legal phenomena?). Finally, the dispute between state-centred and nonstate-centred approaches concerning the explanatory centrality of states in our
theories of non-state legal phenomena (i.e., what role should the state play in our
legal theories?).
In sum, the challenge posed by legal pluralism is more profound than what
jurisprudents commonly believe, and it is not addressed by incorporating the
possibility of non-state legal phenomena. In addition, analytical jurisprudents
should contrast their accounts of law with those of the uniﬁed and non-distinctivist
accounts theories developed by legal pluralists, reconsider, if not abandon, the
methodological centrality that standard theories attribute to the state, and critically
respond to challenges levied by fragmentary legal pluralists. Any reconciliation
attempt between the two traditions, such as pluralist jurisprudence, should also
consider these questions.

80
81

Andrew Halpin and Nicole Roughan, “Introduction,” in In Pursuit of Pluralist Jurisprudence,
ed. Nicole Roughan and Andrew Halpin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 3.
Halpin and Roughan, “The Promises and Pursuits of Pluralist Jurisprudence,” 353.

https://doi.org/10.1017/cls.2021.39 Published online by Cambridge University Press

The Conceptual Problems Arising from Legal Pluralism 175

Jorge Luis Fabra-Zamora
Provost’s Postdoctoral Fellow
Faculty of Law, University of Toronto
jorge.fabrazamora@utoronto.ca

https://doi.org/10.1017/cls.2021.39 Published online by Cambridge University Press

